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When Fiji’s first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara, first used the term the 
“Pacific Way" during an address to the 
UN General Assembly in 1970, its specific 
referent was the smooth transition to 
independence of Fiji and several other Pacific 
island states that had thus far gone through 
the decolonization process. The “Pacific 
Way" was soon used to denote a collective 
political identity for the island states of the 
Pacific region in the postcolonial period 
and, together with the “Melanesian Way", 
developed the characteristics of an anti-
colonial discourse — something that had 
been noticeably lacking in Mara’s original 
formulation. During much the same period, 
Edward Said’s critical study, Orientalism, 
began to make its mark, especially in terms 
of its critique of the nexus between power 
and knowledge and the way in which this 
supported colonial hegemony. This in turn 
provided an important stimulus for the 
development of postcolonial theory as an 
anti-hegemonic discourse critical not just of 
colonial history but manifestations of neo-
colonialism in the contemporary period. 
In this paper I suggest that although the 
“Pacific Way” is generally presented as 
a counter-hegemonic discourse, in some 
manifestations it provides support for other 
kinds of hegemony. This is because it 
has so far evinced very little concern with 
the hegemonic practices of local elites. 
At the same time, it continues to invest in 
the overarching West/non-West bifurcation 
of the world, which also produces quite 
simplistic images of contemporary regional 
politics that mask a much more complex set 
of social, political and economic relations. 
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introduction
In 1970, Fiji’s first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara, delivered an address to the 
UN General Assembly, characterizing the 
experiences shared by Fiji and some other 
Pacific island states in achieving a smooth 
path to independence as the “Pacific Way”. 
This term soon came to denote a collective 
political identity for the island states of the 
Pacific region in the aftermath of indepen-
dence, one which claimed a unique Pacific 
character as based on broadly shared social 
and political values. It also came to acquire 
a strong anti-colonial resonance, comparable 
in some ways to the négritude movement of 
postcolonial Africa as well as the later devel-
opment of discourses about “Asian values” 
and the “ASEAN Way” in East and Southeast 
Asia, all of which sought a reaffirmation of 
local ways in the aftermath of colonial rule. 
The Pacific Way was later joined by a 
more specific assertion of a sub-regional 
identity in the form of the Melanesian Way. 
This was a more profoundly anti-colonial 
articulation of identity from the start.2 Along-
side the regionalist discourses also sit a 
number of nationalist formulations such as 
such as anga fakatonga (the Tongan Way), 
fa’a Samoa (the Samoan Way) and vaka-
viti (the Fijian Way). While focusing on more 
tightly bounded notions of local indigenous 
identities, these nonetheless resonate with 
aspects of the broader regional articulations 
and contribute to their substance. 
In one way or another, all these discourses 
are manifestations of postcolonial thinking — 
a style of thought which is generally critical 
not simply of the colonial past but of the 
continuing effects of that past in the present. 
Thus the Pacific Way and cognate discourses 
have persisted into the present period, often 
as undertones but sometimes more explicitly 
in debates about relations between Pacific 
island states and their regional neighbours, 
especially Australia and New Zealand, 
countries which often stand accused of 
neo-colonial attitudes and practices. At the 
centre of these debates are broad issues of 
governance, security, aid, development and 
dependency, which in turn raise questions of 
accountability, responsibility and sovereign 
rights as well as the efficacy and legitimacy 
of “Western” modes of governance vis-à-vis 
local institutions and practices. The latter 
have often been defended through invocation 
of the Pacific Way, the Melanesian Way and/
or the narrower national formulations. 
The Pacific Way idea has had a varie-
gated political career in the postcolonial 
period. One commentator notes that in its 
early years it reflected a romantic euphoria 
about a Pacific renaissance which could 
embrace modernity while fostering a unique 
Pacific identity shared by all island states, or 
more especially, by emergent Pacific elites 
“who saw themselves as founders … of the 
new postcolonial Pacific order”. (Ratuva, 
2003: 247). While the Pacific Way idea has 
sometimes prompted cynicism, especially 
to the extent that it has been perceived as 
serving the interests of those elites rather 
than Pacific people as a whole, it still has 
much positive currency. Thus despite its elit-
ist orientation, as well as the fact that it is 
often “embarrassingly clichéd", it remains a 
popular way of representing the region col-
lectively. (Meleisa, 2000: 76).
The framework for analysis in this paper 
takes its point of departure from postcolonial 
approaches which have been so influential 
in framing the terms of debate about the 
colonial experience and its aftermath. The 
paper therefore looks first at some of the 
main assumptions of postcolonial theory and 
then the specific circumstances in which the 
Pacific Way was first articulated, as well as 
the meaning with which it was imbued. Here 
we see that although the Pacific Way has 
since acquired many of the characteristics of 
a postcolonial discourse in the critical sense 
in which this term is generally understood, it 
was anything but in its original formulation. 
Accordingly, the next section traces some 
of the shifts in meaning and application 
as it developed over the next few years, 
especially through the voice of academic 
interlocutors. Taken together, these two sec-
tions illustrate a significant transformation in 
meaning, thereby demonstrating some inter-
esting contradictions and tensions.3 We then 
consider the issue of neo-colonialism with 
specific reference to democracy promotion 
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as part of the broader “good governance" 
agenda. Here we look at several critiques of 
Australian policy in particular, and the way 
in which debates about Australia’s relations 
with the Pacific islands has been framed. 
To the extent that these critiques embrace 
the principles of postcolonial analysis they 
also embrace some of its shortcomings. The 
concluding section therefore suggests that 
good critical scholarship, if it is seriously to 
address problems of hegemony in the Pacif-
ic islands, needs to avoid adopting the more 
simplistic postures of postcolonial analysis 
that has limited its scope to date.
Postcolonialism
Edward Said’s critical study Orientalism 
(Said, 1978), is widely regarded as the 
founding text in the genre of postcolonial 
studies. It is a study in comparative lit-
erature, but at the same time is much more 
than that, setting out a scathing political 
and social critique of key aspects of Euro-
pean colonialism. Said’s notion of Oriental-
ism consists in a discourse through which 
Europeans have historically represented the 
“Orient" as an exotic space occupied by an 
inferior “Other" (the Oriental) against which 
positive images of Europe and the Euro-
pean self have been constructed. These 
claims are embedded primarily in a critique 
of colonial power relations and, in particular, 
the links between power, representation 
and knowledge. A recent text proposes that 
postcolonial critique emerges as the product 
of resistance to colonialism and imperial-
ism and therefore identifies primarily with 
the subject position of anti-colonial activists 
(Young, 2001: 15, 19). Postcolonial analysis 
is therefore associated largely with forms of 
resistance to European or Western imperial-
ism and colonialism, the body of ideas which 
supported it, and its ongoing effects. 
The intellectual impact of both Said’s 
original work and the wider field of postco-
lonial theory developed over the past few 
decades has been considerable, spread-
ing well beyond the confines of academia. 
Some would argue, however, that its insights 
have not spread far enough and that it has 
yet to penetrate the thinking, or perhaps 
“unthinking", of various politicians, journal-
ists, bureaucrats, consultants and other 
experts located in metropolitan centres far 
from the everyday lives and experiences 
of Pacific islanders (Fry, 2000). Postcolo-
nial approaches themselves, however, are 
scarcely beyond criticism, especially to the 
extent that they remain concerned with 
issues of cultural identity at the expense of 
pressing issues of political economy which 
are, for many, a matter of life and death. Arif 
Dirlik and Aijaz Ahmed, in particular, have 
also take postcolonial theorists to task for 
abandoning or at least playing down class 
as a category of analysis (Dirlik, 1997; 
Ahmed, 1994). As for postcolonial theory’s 
concern with unmasking historical ideas 
which supported colonialism, even sympa-
thizers such as Michael Hardt see a need to 
move on, arguing that “the residues of colo-
nialist thinking are not the central pillars of 
contemporary forms of domination”.(Hardt, 
2001: 248). To these critiques it may be 
added that postcolonial approaches often 
have a strong tendency to gloss over cases 
involving forms of local (non-Western) domi-
nation and subordination because they do 
not fit the particular normative framework 
of the postcolonial genre which has been 
set up largely as a critique of “Western" 
practices. 
This paper therefore takes issue with 
postcolonial theory’s claims to constitute a 
counter-hegemonic discourse. I argue that 
while it has certainly contributed a great 
deal to the critique of (Western) colonialism 
and its mechanisms of oppression and 
control — which I have no intention of 
defending — it often relies on a normative 
framework based on overly simplistic images 
of oppressors and oppressed. This produces 
a two-dimensional view of the world which 
tends to evade confronting other hegemonic 
practices, especially those of indigenous or 
local elites either during the colonial period or 
in its aftermath, including the contemporary 
period. The next section illustrates some of 
these points through a close study of the 
initial emergence of the Pacific Way concept 
which was anything but anti-colonial in its 
original manifestation. This also highlights 
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some of the ironies of its later appropriation or 
reconstruction as a postcolonial discourse.
the emergence of  
the Pacific Way
When Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara first publicly 
enunciated a version of the “Pacific Way" 
before the UN General Assembly in October 
1970, its specific reference point was Fiji’s 
very recent transition to independence. In 
contrast with other parts of the former colo-
nial world, Mara remarked that this had been 
achieved without great drama or political 
turbulence. 
… But this is nothing new in the Pacific. 
Similar calm and orderly moves to 
independence have taken place in 
Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, in 
Nauru, and in Tonga. We like to think 
that this is the Pacific Way, both geo-
graphically and ideologically ... (Mara, 
1997: 238).
Since the application of the phrase was at 
this point limited to those island states lying 
largely within the central Southwest Pacific 
which had thus far acquired independent 
status, it was scarcely an all-encompassing 
term. However, as prefigured in the speech, 
it was soon to gain much broader currency 
and capacity as other commentators and 
interpreters expanded its ambit and rein-
terpreted its message. The most prominent 
was a New Zealand-born academic, Ron 
Crocombe, who, five years after Mara’s 
original speech on the subject, composed 
a pamphlet of some fifty pages in length in 
which the Pacific Way was invested with a 
great deal more meaning Crocombe, 1976). 
More will be said about Crocombe’s work 
shortly, but for the moment Mara’s thoughts 
are worth exploring further. His memoirs 
published in 1997 under the title, The Pacif-
ic Way may seem a promising starting 
point but despite the title, we find little on 
the substance of his Pacific Way. Despite 
this, the memoirs provide valuable insights 
into Mara’s personal attitudes, especially 
towards Fiji’s colonial past, and so we have 
some access to his original understanding 
of the Pacific Way and related issues. One 
important speech, reprinted in this volume, 
delivered at the conclusion of negotiations at 
Whitehall on the new constitution for an inde-
pendent Fiji in early May 1970, and therefore 
almost contemporaneous with his UN Pacific 
Way speech, illustrates his attitude to Britain 
and its political institutions.
Today marks a long journey … close 
on one hundred years … Through it 
all, we have had the help and guid-
ance of the United Kingdom. Many of 
her traditions are firmly grafted, not 
only on our political institutions, but on 
our whole national life. The rule of law, 
parliamentary democracy, respect for 
the rights of minorities, a sense of fair 
play, give and take, are all taken for 
granted in Fiji, but they are, in a very 
real sense, a legacy from the British. 
Should we ever wish to forget the Brit-
ish — which God forbid — it would not 
be possible. Your ways and your ideas 
are too much part and parcel of our 
own. … (Mara, 1997: 104).
Several of Mara’s remarks about the 
UN’s Decolonization Committee are also 
worth noting, for they reflect long-standing 
attitudes among Fiji’s indigenous elites to 
the prospect of independence. On a number 
of occasions, Mara comments negatively on 
forces within the UN during the 1960s that 
were pushing decolonization for remain-
ing colonies: “In 1962 Western Samoa had 
become independent and Nauru was on the 
way. In Fiji we were trying to stem the tide of 
independence whipped up by agitation at the 
United Nations." (Mara, 1997: 170).
At least some other authors have largely 
ignored such sentiments or provided distort-
ed accounts of Fijian attitudes. Michael Haas, 
author of a substantial work on the Pacific 
Way as a regionalist enterprise, asserts that; 
“In the context of the eventual attainment 
of independence in the South Pacific, Fiji’s 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara … began to give a 
series of addresses concerning the Pacific 
Way based in part on the views of Ratu Lala 
Sukuna, who struggled for Fijian indepen-
dence until his death in 1958”. (Haas, 1989: 
9). The latter part of Haas’s statement is a 
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serious misrepresentation of the historical 
record. Neither Sukuna nor any other of Fiji’s 
chiefly elite “struggled" for independence. If 
anything they resisted for as long as they 
could. Indeed, it is possible to read many 
parts of the colonial historical record as one 
of cooperation between British colonizing 
agents and the eastern Fijian chiefly elite 
who saw many advantages in the colonial 
arrangement. Class identification must also 
count as a factor since the upper levels of the 
British colonial service, when encountering 
strongly hierarchical structures of authority 
with paramount chiefs at the apex, were very 
much inclined to see the self in the other, and 
vice-versa.(see Lawson 2010b; Cannadine, 
2001). Those most strongly supportive of 
independence were in fact Indo-Fijians — a 
group almost completely excluded from the 
ambit of the Pacific Way. 
It is easy enough to pick out many 
statements illustrating a close relationship 
between the British colonial authorities and 
certain indigenous elites in Fiji, but it would 
be misleading to suggest that all aspects of 
the relationship between the British colonial 
administrators and Sukuna, Mara and other 
Fijian leaders were entirely congenial. Of 
course there were serious differences over 
policy matters from time to time. There were 
also several dissident movements among 
indigenous Fijians during the colonial period, 
although some of these were as much 
opposed to the chiefly elite as to the colo-
nial regime. And clearly the experiences of 
colonialism elsewhere in the Pacific as well 
as in other parts of the world were often very 
different. This is why one needs to be care-
ful about making any grand generalizations 
about the colonial experience or its legacy. 
To summarize, Mara’s original articulation 
of the Pacific Way can scarcely be consid-
ered “postcolonial" in the critical sense out-
lined above. The fact that it was put forward 
as an object lesson in model behaviour by 
both the former colonies and by the coloniz-
ing powers reflects very different sentiments 
from those assumed by postcolonial critiques 
which often see nothing but the dynamics of 
domination and resistance in colonial rela-
tionships while sweeping aside the conver-
gence of class hierarchies and empathies 
in conservative ideologies that are certainly 
evident in Fiji’s colonial record, if not else-
where. The transformation of the Pacific Way 
into something resembling a more genuine 
postcolonial discourse, and which therefore 
lent itself more readily to a critique of neo-
colonialism, was left to a prominent expatri-
ate academic commentator on Pacific affairs 
whose work we consider next. 
from mara’s Way to 
crocomBe’s Way
Ron Crocombe’s interpretation of the term 
Mara had first coined appeared in a fifty-
page pamphlet, The Pacific Way, published 
six years after Mara’s speech. Crocombe’s 
pamphlet noted the extent to which it had 
been taken up around the island Pacific, 
“probably because it satisfies both psycho-
logical and political needs, in that it helps to 
fulfill a growing demand for respected Pacif-
ic-wide identifying symbols and for Pacific 
unity" and because “effective unifying con-
cepts can reduce the extent and intensity 
of neo-colonial dependency of the islands 
countries [sic] on the richer Pacific border-
lands". Crocombe, however, targeted not 
only neo-colonialism, but the broader history 
of colonialism in the Pacific, stating that: “The 
colonial experience left a common unpleas-
ant taste in the mouths of islands people: a 
common humiliation, a common feeling of 
deprivation and exploitation”. (Crocombe, 
1976:13). Although this may have been how 
some Pacific islanders felt, nothing could 
be further from the sentiments embodied in 
Mara’s original formulation and in his other 
statements which form the broader context. 
Crocombe’s analysis, however, was not 
altogether uncritical of indigenous pratices, 
and he noted the potential for the Pacific 
Way idea to operate in the service of elite 
privilege. He also identified a core of island 
elites from Fiji, Tonga and what was then 
Western Samoa for whom the Pacific Way 
had particular significance. He therefore sug-
gested that the Pacific Way applied primar-
ily “to an inner group of English-speaking, 
tropical islands of the south Pacific; and only 
secondarily and with less intensity of involve-
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ment or meaning to all other Pacific islands”. 
Crocombe further proposed that the chiefly 
ideology emanating from the core island 
groups exhibiting strongly hierarchical socio-
political structures had considerable strength 
and influence over the broader region , at 
least to the extent that “the idea of chieftain-
ship had become an accepted part of the 
Pacific Way … ". He went on to suggest that 
in the Pacific Way discourse, the differences 
between these highly stratified hereditary 
hierarchies on the one hand, and the “bot-
tom up" egalitarian systems of societies in 
other parts of the Western Pacific — namely 
Melanesia — on the other, tended to be 
minimized, “for the development of Pacific 
unity necessitates a playing down of internal 
differences and a maximizing of similarities”. 
(Crocombe, 1976: 11). 
Crocombe also noted that the model 
prevailing in the core group, with its strongly 
hierarchical sociopolitical structures, had 
considerable strength and influence over the 
broader region, at least to the extent that “the 
idea of chieftainship had become an accept-
ed part of the Pacific Way, even though there 
is some vacillating between valuing privilege 
and valuing its opposite — equality”. But he 
warned that if the Pacific Way became too 
closely identified with an elite or with the 
older generation, it may well lose the capac-
ity to appeal to a broader cross-section of 
Pacific people. (Crocombe, 1976: 12). 
Crocombe’s treatment of the Pacific Way 
thus differed significantly from Mara’s formu-
lation in two important respects. First, while 
Mara’s contained no hint of hostility to colo-
nial rule in terms of his own personal experi-
ence, Crocombe’s emphasized that colonial 
rule was a source of humiliation for all those 
subject to it — whether they realized it or 
not. Second, Mara infused the Pacific Way, 
at least implicitly, with the values of tradi-
tional chiefly rule. Crocombe incorporated 
these in his expanded version of the idea, 
but sounded some clear warnings about the 
potential abuse of elite status. Where Mara 
and Crocombe did tend to converge was on 
the theme of neo-colonialism, although this 
is much more explicit in Crocombe’s work. I 
suggest that it is this, more than the colonial 
past, that has been a principal driver of the 
Pacific Way discourse since at least the 
mid-1970s. 
neo-colonialism in  
the Pacific islands
“Neo-colonialism" refers generally to a situa-
tion in which relatively more powerful coun-
tries tend to exercise economic, cultural 
and/or political power over weaker or smaller 
countries. The latter may have formal inde-
pendent status but sovereignty is seen as 
heavily compromised by continuing relations 
of dependence on either the former colonial 
power, or on other powers with interests in 
them, or both. The term “neo-colonialism" 
was first articulated by the Ghanaian lead-
er, Kwame Nkrumah, who also advocated 
a form of pan-Africanism as a means of 
resistance. (Nkrumah, 1966). To the extent 
that it was a regionalist discourse which 
sought to bring African states under a single 
umbrella of identity, it shares many similari-
ties with the Pacific Way. A major difference 
between Nkrumah and Mara, however, was 
that the former was a left-leaning intellec-
tual strongly influenced by Marxism. Mara 
could scarcely have been more different. 
His was a thoroughly conservative outlook 
which projected a very different perspective 
on the colonial past, although he was wary 
enough of a neo-colonial future. Another 
major point of difference was with respect to 
the role of indigenous elites which Nkrumah 
saw as perfectly capable of selling out the 
interests of the masses. This is not a sub-
ject with which Mara engaged much, if at 
all. Indeed, with respect to his own country, 
Mara expended much effort in defending 
elite indigenous institutions as essential to 
the preservation of Fijian identity in the face 
of alleged threats posed by the immigrant 
Indo-Fijian community.
This section is primarily concerned with 
how the promotion of democratic politics 
within the island states — something which 
directly challenges the power of traditional 
elites in the core island states of the South-
west Pacific — is often regarded as a mani-
festation of neo-colonialism against which 
the Pacific Way and cognate concepts have 
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been deployed. While there are a number of 
important players in the region, including the 
European Union, the US, Japan and, more 
recently, China and Taiwan (in a rivalrous 
relationship), it is Australia and New Zea-
land which are most commonly targeted as 
engaging in neo-colonial practices. Both are 
members of the Pacific Islands Forum them-
selves and therefore more closely involved 
in the politics of the region. 
“Democracy promotion" has become 
closely associated with the activities of the 
US, especially in the Middle East, with signif-
icant negative consequences for the regard 
in which it is held as a foreign policy strat-
egy.4 The manner and extent of “democracy 
promotion" engaged in by Australia and New 
Zealand with respect to the Pacific Islands is 
scarcely in the same league, but it has none-
theless raised concerns about the degree to 
which it represents neo-colonial interference 
in the sovereign affairs of island states as 
well as reflecting notions of superiority and 
overbearing attitudes generally. 
Democracy promotion itself is multi-
faceted with one of the most prominent and 
widely criticized aspects being associated 
with the World Bank’s “good governance and 
anti-corruption" agenda. While the stated 
aims of the agenda are hardly objectionable, 
directed as they are towards poverty-
reduction and raising standards of living for 
the world’s most under-privileged people, its 
association with neo-liberal political economy 
is another matter. The latter is geared 
towards privatization, deregulation and the 
hollowing out of government capacity in the 
delivery of social goods, and has attracted 
much-deserved criticism for undermining 
state capacity. Indeed to the extent that 
states are sometimes seen as “failed" or at 
least “failing" we are entitled to ask whether 
certain neo-liberal impositions linked to the 
good governance program as well as to 
the broader dynamics of globalization are 
themselves a factor. These aspects of “good 
governance", however, are not the main 
concern here. Rather it is the problem of 
instituting and/or sustaining basic democratic 
institutions in which governments may be 
held to account — not simply to Western 
donors but to their own people.
A major catalyst for discussions sur-
rounding democracy in the Pacific islands 
and the role of Australia and New Zealand in 
promoting democratic values was the coup 
in Fiji in May 1987 when Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sitiveni Rabuka marched into parliament 
accompanied by armed soldiers, rounded 
up and incarcerated members of the elected 
government at gunpoint, and declared him-
self in charge. This government had only 
weeks before defeated the Alliance Party led 
by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara at general elec-
tions conducted under the very constitution 
that Mara had worked to develop together 
with Indo-Fijian leaders and the former colo-
nial power. But the constitution had not guar-
anteed perpetual power for Mara’s party and, 
in the face of considerable political disunity 
among indigenous Fijians, the Alliance lost 
government after 17 years in office. It was a 
loss that he and the party did not take well.
The coup was justified in terms of the rights 
of indigenous Fijians vis-à-vis the “immigrant 
race" of Indo-Fijians, under which rubric the 
value of indigenous ways, and by implication 
the Pacific Way, was asserted very forcefully 
over and above “alien" institutions such 
as parliamentary democracy and all that it 
entailed. Given the prominence of chiefly 
classes in Fijian politics to that time, chiefly 
systems and the values associated with 
them such as consensus decision making 
were valorized as authentic expressions of 
indigenous identities. These were contrasted 
explicitly with the inauthenticity of liberal 
democratic values said to promote dissensus 
and conflict and which were therefore contrary 
to the Pacific Way’s core value of consensus 
(see, generally, Lawson, 1991).
Similar debates about the merits and 
demerits of democracy have marked pro-
cesses of political reform in Samoa, espe-
cially in relation to the extension of voting 
rights to all Samoans in the early 1990s, and 
in Tonga which is presently experiencing the 
most thoroughgoing changes to its consti-
tutional structure in more than 130 years.5 
In both countries, political reforms have 
sought to provide greater opportunities for 
participation by ordinary citizens — that is, 
those without chiefly or “noble" status — by 
at least voting for their own representatives 
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or, in the case of Tonga, by having more than 
just three “commoner" representatives in the 
parliament at all. These reforms have been 
pursued in the face of opposition by conser-
vative chiefly figures who, not surprisingly, 
have sought to preserve their own political 
status and privileges. But by far the most 
significant point to emerge from all this is 
that the pressures for democratic reform in 
both Samoa and Tonga have come largely 
from within. Neither country has been sub-
ject to serious external pressure to institute 
reforms. 
In Tonga the reform process has been 
instigated almost entirely by its own home-
grown pro-democracy movement which has 
campaigned for decades for some form 
of parliamentary democracy to enhance 
accountability. The reaction of many mem-
bers of the royal family and nobility over the 
years has ranged from disparaging com-
ments about the abilities of commoners to 
participate in important matters of policy to 
overtly repressive measures such as the 
incarceration of pro-democracy figures and 
the closing down of critical media. It is under 
such circumstances that the Pacific Way has 
often been invoked to support authoritarian 
practices and to brand those with the audac-
ity to question their leaders as “un-Pacific". 
(Ratuva, 2004; see also Roberston, 2005).
Where statements of support for the 
pro-democracy movement have come from 
countries like Australia and New Zealand, 
these have rankled deeply with the estab-
lishment. In a previous article, I noted a 
familiar condemnation by the then king’s 
youngest son and Prime Minister, Prince 
Ulukalala Lavaka Ata who accused outsiders 
critical of the Tongan establishment of simply 
not “understanding" Tongan politics and soci-
ety. Addressing Westerners at large who, he 
said, wanted to impose their (democratic) 
values on Tonga: “You don’t see things as a 
Tongan … You see things as a Westerner. So 
it’s very hard for you to understand". (cited in 
Lawson 2006a:100). This de-legitimation of 
outsiders as incapable of “understanding" 
is one thing, but if the autocratic system 
under which Tonga has been ruled to date 
truly reflected widely shared Tongan values, 
the question then becomes one of why so 
many (commoner) Tongans have pushed for 
democratic reforms. The answer can only be 
that commoners, who surely do “understand" 
Tongan politics and society, actually reject 
certain key aspects of anga fakatonga that 
support the existing system. 
Established elites within the islands, 
however, have not been the only ones 
to denounce external criticism. One New 
Zealand business leader (a member of the 
board of the New Zealand Pacific Business 
Council), commenting on political crises in 
the region in general and Fiji’s latest coup in 
particular, suggested that instead of expect-
ing Pacific islanders to conform to “so-called 
“western-style” democracy", Australian and 
New Zealand political leaders, as well as the 
media, needed to adopt a more sensitive 
approach. And rather than impose sanctions, 
they should concede that the Pacific Way 
may be a superior way of resolving Pacific 
disputes (Flanagan, 2007). What exactly 
he thought this entailed, however, was not 
altogether clear, although it seemed to mean 
that “traditional society, culture and values", 
which he said had functioned satisfacto-
rily in the past, ought not necessarily to be 
replaced by “Westminster-style" democracy 
which, it was further asserted, had taken 
over twenty-five centuries to evolve. Apart 
from being a grossly inaccurate reading of 
the historical development of parliamen-
tary democracy in the UK, it shows very 
little knowledge of how “introduced" political 
institutions have actually been adapted in 
the region. Tonga’s constitutional monarchy, 
defended (by conservative elites) as the very 
essence of the Tongan-ness, is based sub-
stantially on the British model as it existed in 
the mid-nineteenth century. 
While most of Fiji’s constitutions resemble 
the Westminster model in some respects, 
its most important provision — namely 
those concerning elections and eligibility 
for office — bear almost no resemblance to 
contemporary Westminster practice. There 
is certainly nothing in the latter that supports 
racially designated seats and constituencies. 
Similar points can be made about Samoa’s 
constitutional set-up. Further, none of the 
constitutions have simply been “imposed" 
from outside. They all represent negotiated 
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political settlements with local conditions 
very much in mind. Thus, as Peter Larmour 
suggests, too much can be made of the 
foreignness of the state and its institutions 
(Larmour, 2003: 24). It must also be 
emphasized that calls for democratic reforms 
have come largely from within rather than 
from outside the societies concerned. These 
issues aside, the same commentator also 
point outs that if Australia and New Zealand 
make too much of a fuss about democracy 
and human rights then Asian countries, 
which have no concerns with such matters, 
could displace them both economically 
and geopolitically. For Australian and New 
Zealand business elites, this is probably 
more to the point.
As mentioned above, the role of Australia 
and New Zealand in pushing for reforms in 
both Samoa and Tonga has been low-key. 
With respect to Samoa’s reforms, these 
were simply welcomed as enhancing demo-
cratic politics in the country by providing for 
greater popular participation. With respect 
to Tonga, New Zealand government figures 
have made critical comments from time to 
time — often depicted as “hectoring", and 
these have usually been met with predict-
able defensiveness on the part of the Tongan 
elite who of course reject New Zealand’s 
right to “interfere". But practical action such 
as even a threat to suspend aid has not been 
contemplated. Indeed a suggestion by Ton-
gan pro-democracy leader, Akilisi Pohiva, 
in 2008 that New Zealand aid be suspend-
ed until the country had become properly 
democratic was flatly rejected by the then 
New Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff 
(reported at <http://www.rnzi.com/ pages/
news.php?op=read&id=10681>, accessed 
26/10/08). 
None of this means that aid programs 
have not been, or would not be, suspended 
in other circumstances. Some forms of aid 
to Fiji have been suspended by both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand — and some other 
Western donors — following the coups. 
This has angered the various coup leaders 
through the years who have consistently 
cited external “interference" in their internal 
affairs as unacceptable and, at certain times, 
as a manifestation of neo-colonialism. There 
are of course alternative sources of aid, and 
the rivalry between China and Taiwan in 
particular has seen a substantial increase in 
aid flows in the Pacific islands as they vie for 
recognition and influence. China’s increas-
ing presence in the region, in particular, has 
caused some consternation in Canberra and 
Wellington where the no-strings-attached 
aid packages are seen as undermining good 
governance programs, especially in the area 
of corruption. One report cites a US$25 mil-
lion package to Solomon Islands provided by 
Taiwan, ostensibly as aid to victims of ethnic 
violence, as going straight into the pockets 
of officials, militia leaders and police. Other 
projects funded by China to build infrastruc-
ture, such as new government buildings, 
use only Chinese architects, engineers and 
labour on the sites, and so underemployed 
local people are left out. The report recom-
mended that China co-ordinate its aid effort 
with countries like Australia to ensure that 
funds go to where they are needed most. 
Interestingly, the report noted further that this 
might remove some of the bargaining power 
from Pacific leaders “who are skilled at play-
ing aid donors against another”. (Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, 2008). This latter 
remark suggests that there is more to the 
aid game than a simple model of relations 
of neo-colonial dependency between donor 
and recipient suggests.
To return briefly to the issue of democracy 
and the coups in Fiji, the latest coup leader, 
Frank Bainimarama, has of course been 
subject to the same condemnations from 
Australia and New Zealand as have previous 
coup leaders, and he has reacted with the 
same accusations of neo-colonial arrogance 
and “lack of understanding" that his pre-
decessors have. He has been particularly 
vociferous in his criticism of Australia and, 
after expelling both the Australian and 
New Zealand High Commissioners in late 
2009, also expelled Australia’s Acting High 
Commissioner in July 2010. This followed 
the deferral of a meeting of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group which had been scheduled 
to meet in Fiji but which Australia had lobbied 
against (reported at <http://www.abc.net.
au/news/stories/2010/07/13/2952502.htm>, 
accessed 14 July 2010). Bainimarama’s 
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immediate predecessor, Laisenia Qarase, 
who Bainimarama was instrumental in 
appointing as interim prime minister in the 
caretaker government after the 2000 coup, 
was at that time also critical of suggestions 
that Fiji should follow “Western" democratic 
norms (BBC, 2008). After his own ousting, 
however, his support for “Western" democratic 
elections and constitutional processes 
strengthened dramatically. 
Numerous other instances could be cited 
to illustrate the point that political actors 
will almost invariably support democratic 
institutions when they deliver desirable 
political outcomes — desirable, that is, 
from the point of view of their particular 
interests — but often condemn them as 
“culturally unsuitable" when they don’t. 
Similarly, criticisms from Australia and New 
Zealand can easily be dismissed as neo-
colonial arrogance and interference when 
it suits various political actors, but those 
same actors may prove only too ready 
to accept (neo-colonial) aid packages or 
benefits on other occasions. On the other 
hand, both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments are often content to deal with 
undemocratic regimes as long as they are 
stable, secure, and don’t present a threat to 
broader regional security. Tonga and Samoa 
are hardly models of liberal democracy but, 
as we have seen, they have not been 
subject to “neo-colonial intervention" beyond 
occasional critical remarks during times of 
political unrest.
Postcolonial critiques  
of neo-colonialism:  
missing the mark?
Pacific islanders involved in coups or other 
distinctly undemocratic practice are not the 
only ones to accuse Australia and New 
Zealand of neo-colonial propensities. A num-
ber of academics and other commentators, 
located in a variety of metropolitan settings, 
have weighed in with more serious and 
penetrating criticisms. Of these, Greg Fry’s 
essay on “Framing the Islands" represents 
a thoroughgoing attack on certain Austra-
lian neo-colonial attitudes and practices in 
government and the media which came to 
prominence in the 1990s and which paint-
ed a “doomsday" scenario for the islands 
— unless island peoples remake themselves 
by abandoning certain local practices and 
taking some “hard decisions". Fry’s own 
analysis is framed very explicitly in a post-
colonial mode of analysis which takes as its 
point of departure Edward Said’s articulation 
of “Orientalism" which, says Fry, is highly 
relevant “to other contexts in which people 
are grouped together and represented by 
outsiders who wish at the same time to man-
age, control, or prescribe for the peoples 
they are depicting”. (Fry, 2000: 29-30). But 
no mention is made of island elites who are 
also implicated in framing and representing 
Pacific islanders in ways that reflect their 
own positions of power, their own particular 
constructions of “knowledge", and their own 
interests in social control. This includes not 
only political figures but conservative church 
leaders, business people and so on.6 
The invocation of “outsiders" implies its 
essential opposite, “insiders", which brings 
into question the problematic notion of “the 
native point of view" as a singular category.7 
Given that “native societies" of Pacific island 
states are often highly pluralistic, it seems 
obvious that there are multiple ways of 
being “a native" and therefore seeing as “a 
native". The insider–outsider dichotomy has 
any number of further ramifications, at both 
regional and national levels. With respect to 
the latter, Malama Meleisea has argued that 
the objectification of Samoan-ness through 
fa’a Samoa is a common defence against 
“outsiders" (Meleisia, 2005: 86). Much the 
same can be said about the Tongan and 
Fijian variants while the Pacific Way pro-
vides a broader defence against what Borof-
sky describes as “Outlanders" (non-Pacific 
Islanders). He further suggests that oppos-
ing Outlanders offers a ready way to mobilize 
Islanders — silencing the differences within 
and becoming a call to action against “oth-
ers"8 (Borofsky, 2000: 13). None of these 
considerations enter into Fry’s analysis.
Another critique of Australian approaches 
to the Pacific islands offered by journalist 
and writer Nic Maclellan concerns the period 
after “9/11", the Bali bombing and the war 
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in Iraq, when issues of transnational crime, 
immigration policy and national security, 
have been accompanied by rhetoric about a 
regional “arc of insecurity" and failed or failing 
states in Australia’s Pacific neighbourhood. 
As a consequence, he, says, less attention 
has been paid to pressing concerns in the 
more mundane field of human security and 
development for ordinary Pacific islanders in 
their everyday lives. He offers a particularly 
stringent critique at the “Pacific solution" 
devised by the Howard government for 
detaining asylum seekers from the Middle 
East and elsewhere in Pacific island locations 
rather than having them interred on Australia 
territory (Maclellan, 2003: 1). This “solution" 
resonates uncomfortably with the US practice 
of detaining suspected “illegal combatants" 
offshore in Guantanamo Bay and has been 
widely — and rightly — condemned by 
human rights groups. This particular critique, 
however, does not point out that Pacific 
islands have themselves cooperated in 
this “solution". Once again, Pacific Islander 
leaders are depicted as having no agency, 
no role to play in such policies. Yet it is 
the President of Nauru, home to one of 
the Howard government’s detention centres, 
that sought very proactively to be considered 
for a new regional processing centre for 
refugees under the Gillard Government’s 
plan, and was looking to sign up to the 
UN’s convention on refugees to enhance 
its chances (see <www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2010/07/13/2952623.htm>, accessed 
14 July 2010).9
Another study by Hawaiian based aca-
demic, David Chappell, looks at recent 
crises in Melanesia — including coups, 
civil wars and other crises — and roundly 
condemns the “new wave of criticisms of 
indigenous regimes and cultures by met-
ropolitan aid donors and security experts" 
(Chappell, 2005: 286).10 The article argues 
that Australian neo-colonialism has chal-
lenged self-government in the Pacific island 
states, especially in Melanesia, where it has 
“organized military interventions and polic-
ing operations in the Solomons and PNG, 
placed inspectors in local finance ministries 
to see that aid money is spent the way Aus-
tralia wants it to be spent, and engineered 
the election of an Australian as head of the 
regional Pacific Forum (sic), despite indig-
enous opposition”. (Chappell, 2005: 316).11 
While not denying that large countries are 
very often overbearing vis-à-vis smaller, 
weaker, aid-dependent countries, such anal-
yses lack nuance. The Solomons interven-
tion was invited, not forced, and consisted 
not simply of Australian personnel but con-
tingents from Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea and Tonga (Shibuya, 2006). The 
Australian who headed the Forum from 2005 
until his death in August 2008 was strongly 
supported by a number of Pacific island 
leaders, and was awarded posthumously the 
Cross of Solomon Islands for his “outstand-
ing contribution" to the Regional Assistance 
Mission there (Pacific Islands Forum Secre-
tariat, 2008).
A fourth critique also takes explicit aim 
at neo-liberal/neo-colonial elements of 
Australian intervention, suggesting that the 
Australian state and investment groups 
have clear imperial ambitions in the region. 
Noting the link between aid and good 
governance, it is further suggested that 
the good governance agenda promoted by 
Australia faces “immediate confrontation 
with the post-colonial aspiration of “self-
governance", only recently attained in all 
the island states”. (Anderson, 2007: 13–14). 
The paper also notes that the demand for 
open markets has been accompanied by 
a repression of public capacity building. 
A more serious accusation is that security 
interventions, for example in Solomon 
Islands and Timor Leste, are accompanied 
by powerful political interventions, although 
Australian interventionism, is constrained 
by the Portuguese presence in Timor Leste 
and a growing Chinese presence in the 
region generally (Anderson, 2007: 13). No 
comment on whether these also constitute 
neo-colonial ventures, however, is offered.
All these critiques, and others like them, 
make valuable points about Australian 
government policies with respect to its Pacific 
neighbours, as well as asylum seekers from 
further abroad, some of which have been 
short-sighted, ill-informed, self-interested and 
morally reprehensible — at least according to 
“Western" human rights standards. But like 
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Said’s original condemnation of “Orientalism", 
such critiques are too often unidimensional. 
Said constructed Orientalism as a critique of 
European colonial and other practices that 
was highly selective and which ignored other 
aspects of European social and political 
thought that did not always frame “others" 
in the terms he described.12 Nor did his 
work investigate complexities introduced by 
considerations of class or gender. 
The limited scope of Said’s analysis 
therefore left him open to a range of criti-
cism, including the extent to which his work 
was infused with an implicit Occidentalism 
— a way of representing Europe or “the 
West" in terms at least as simplistic and 
essentializing as his construction of Orien-
talism. It also tended to depict native people 
as passive victims of imperial depredations. 
In a subsequent work, Said stated that he 
had not meant to suggest such passivity and 
acknowledged that there had always been 
elements of resistance (see Said, 1993). 
Even so, his observations on the dynamics 
of colonial relations did not go beyond cat-
egories of domination and resistance — a 
binary that has over-simplified a much more 
complex field of interaction which included 
not only opposition but collaboration and 
cooperation in the colonial project as well. 
Furthermore, the latter strategies are hardly 
absent from the contemporary sphere of 
postcolonial politics where islander agency 
at all levels is alive and well. To suggest oth-
erwise is indeed to belittle the dynamism of 
politics and society in the Pacific islands.
To summarize this section, there is little 
doubt that aspects of the foreign policy 
behaviour of Australia and New Zealand can 
be cast in neo-colonialist terms, especially 
since both are important aid providers and 
both have used aid conditionality in the 
broad context of democracy promotion and 
“good governance" more generally. How-
ever, consideration of other factors surround-
ing democracy promotion and the quest 
for domestic security by groups within the 
islands, as well as those outside, reveals a 
more complex story.13 These complexities 
are missed in postcolonial analyses which 
too often seek only to critique the behaviour 
of outside powers, aid agencies, corpora-
tions, media and the like in their dealings 
with the islands. As mentioned earlier, while 
much postcolonial analysis presents as a 
counter-hegemonic discourse — and often 
shrouds itself in an aura of moral superior-
ity in the process — it rarely subjects the 
hegemonic practices of indigenous elites to 
anything but superficial scrutiny. 
conclusion
From the time of its original articulation, the 
Pacific Way idea has undergone some inter-
esting transformations. Initially conceived in 
terms of the orderly political transitions expe-
rienced by Fiji and its immediate neighbours 
in the Southwest Pacific in the process of 
decolonization, and at that stage lacking any 
hint of critique with respect to the colonial 
experience itself, the Pacific Way idea none-
theless evolved into a regionalist discourse 
with strong postcolonial resonances. In the 
course of this transformation, the colonial 
past and many of its legacies came to be 
treated much more negatively and critically. 
More importantly, however, perceptions of a 
neo-colonial present have become dominant 
themes in Pacific Way discourses, especially 
in the context of “good governance" agendas 
promoted by a variety of actors including 
Australia and New Zealand.
The alignment of these agendas solely 
with an instrumental neo-colonialism, how-
ever, is unsustainable. Among other things, it 
suggests that Pacific islanders do not value 
good governance and that corruption, non-
accountability and non-democratic forms of 
politics are acceptable to significant sec-
tors of the population. Having said that, it is 
certainly the case that other aspects of the 
good governance agenda concerned with 
the promotion of neo-liberalism, including 
deregulation and the hollowing out of state 
capacity are matters of genuine concern 
(and are by no means defended here). There 
is therefore a need to adopt a more nuanced 
approach to critiques addressing the broad 
idea of good governance and what it means 
in the contemporary Pacific.
On the more specific question of democ-
racy promotion, it is certainly the case that 
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liberal/Western forms of democracy do 
involve competitive elections and are there-
fore adversarial in character. Further, to the 
extent that the Pacific Way embraces “con-
sensus” as a core value, aspects of democ-
racy do indeed appear to clash with this 
particular value. But it would be a mistake to 
say that the value of consensus is absent in 
democratic systems. It is actually essential in 
supporting the legitimacy of those institutions 
which provide not merely for elections but 
also for changes of government by constitu-
tional means. The idea of “consensus” as a 
core elements of the Pacific Way or any of 
the “national” ways mentioned here is, in any 
case, scarcely unproblematic. In terms of 
local politics, it has been closely associated 
with conservative chiefly leadership where 
“consensus” may mean little more than con-
formity with the wishes of that leadership. 
This has in any case been extraordinarily 
difficult to achieve at national leve (Hender-
son, 2003: 229). Furthermore, if consensus 
has hitherto characterized relations between 
Pacific island nations in regional fora, then it 
is because contentious political issues have 
usually been avoided, at least until recently.14 
Critiques of Australian/New Zealand neo-
colonialist policy and practice in the Pacific 
islands also tend assiduously to avoid nega-
tive assessments of indigenous actors. One 
exception is the kind of regionalist discourse 
promoted by Epeli Hau’ofa in his notion of 
Oceania as a “sea of islands”. In this there 
is no shortage of criticism of former colonial 
powers and “the belittling views of indige-
nous cultures” purveyed by Europeans from 
the earliest years of interaction, and which 
continues to this day. But as Hau’ofa goes 
on to point out, 
Europeans did not invent belittlement. 
In many societies it was part and 
parcel of indigenous cultures. In the 
aristocratic societies of Polynesia par-
allel relationships of dominance and 
subordination with their paraphernalia 
of appropriate attitudes and behavior 
were the order of the day. In Tonga, 
the term for commoners is me’a vale, 
“the ignorant ones”, which is a survival 
from an era when the aristocracy con-
trolled all the important knowledge in 
the society. Keeping the ordinary folk 
in the dark and calling them ignorant 
made it easier to control and subordi-
nate them (Hau’ofa, 1999: 28). 
This is the kind of critique that is able to 
go beyond at least some of the familiar but 
often misleading binaries found in so much 
postcolonial analysis: Western/non-Western, 
oppressors/oppressed, bad guy/good guy, 
and so on. Maintaining these dichotomies 
do not serve the cause of serious critical 
political, social or historical studies. If criti-
cal scholarship is to do its job in addressing 
the general problem of hegemony in human 
relations, and the variety of forms that domi-
nation and subordination take, then it must 
look to exposing hegemonic practices wher-
ever and whenever they occur rather than 
confining such investigations to a single set 
of relations posited in a simplistic opposi-
tional format that limits the scope of genuine 
critical analysis.
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endnotes
1. This an abridged version of a paper 
originally prepared for presentation at 
the 18th Biennial Conference of the 
Pacific History Association (PHA); 8–12 
December 2008, Suva, Fiji. Some of the 
more historical aspects of this longer 
paper have been reworked in a different 
article forthcoming in the Journal of 
Pacific History (December 2010), “ ‘The 
Pacific Way’ as Postcolonial Discourse: 
Towards a Reassessment”. The present 
version was prepared for presentation 
to the State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia Program (SSGM), The 
Australian National University, 4 February 
2010. I’m grateful to the audiences at both 
the PHA conference (including the late 
Ron Crocombe) and the SSGM seminar 
participants for their helpful comments 
and insights. Thanks also to Karin von 
Strokirch and the anonymous readers for 
the SSGM Working Paper series for very 
helpful feedback on the topic.
2. This form of regional identity is dealt with 
in another paper (see Lawson, 2010b).
3. The material in these sections is a brief 
summary of the more extensive treatment 
of these issues in the forthcoming article 
in Lawson (2010a, forthcoming). 
4. For a broad overview, see Carothers 
(2004). Democracy promotion has also 
formed an important part of the EU’s 
foreign policy strategy, coming under the 
terms of its “normative power” mission. For 
a recent commentary, see Sjursen (2006).




6. A later paper, equally critical of Australia’s 
bid to assert regional hegemony, does 
acknowledge very briefly that challenges 
by NGOs, sovereignty movements 
and women’s groups, among others, 
sometimes challenge state elites in the 
islands. See Greg Fry, Whose Oceania? 
Contending Visions of Community in 
Pacific Region-Building, Working Paper 
2004/3, Canberra: The Australian National 
University, 2004, p.5.
7. For a pertinent discussion of the politics 
of “the native point of view” see Teaiwa, 
2005, pp.15–36.
8. For a pertinent discussion of the reactive 
objectification of culture in different 
historical contexts, including processes of 
oppositional reification and inversion, see 
also Thomas (1992).
9. Had the Liberal–National Coalition under 
Tony Abbott won government, the “Nauru 
Solution” would have gone ahead. 
10. The title refers to an earlier article (Reilly, 
2000) in which recent troublespots in the 
region are highlighted and compared 
directly with the poor performance of sub-
Saharan African countries across a range 
of political, economic and social indicators.
11.The appointment of an Australian as 
Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands 
Forum is also criticized in Fry, Whose 
Oceania, 2004, p.11 where it is stated that 
the appointment flew in the face of efforts 
by a generation of Pacific islanders to 
decolonize South Pacific regionalism.
12. For specific illustrations of this point 
see Lawson (2006b) and Porter (1994 
esp. p.159).
13.One careful study of the Solomon’s 
intervention is critical of both Australian 
policy and its motivations on the one 
hand, as well as that of local actors, and 
therefore provides a well-balanced and 
ultimately more useful critical study. See 
Kabutaulaka (2005).
14. The adoption by the Pacific Islands Forum 
of the Biketawa Declaration in 2000, and 
the Pacific Plan in 2005, however, have 
both signaled a new preparedness to 
consider matters of internal politics among 
member states, thus moving away from 
the rigid doctrine of non-interference which 
featured in earlier Pacific Way discourses. 
See Urwin (2005).
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